Gandhi and Kashmir

From The Statesman
Little is known about the role which Gandhi played with regard to the Kashmir issue during the last few months of his life. The stand which he took shows that his idealism did not prevent him from being practical. His blend of the two led Kingsley Martin of the New Statesman and Nations, who interviewed him a few days before his death, to observe: “My affection for Gandhi and my knowledge that he was a great man were not impaired by the discovery that he was still a Hindu nationalist and an imperfect disciple of the Mahatma.” Gandhi was anxious to lend a helping hand to resolve the Kashmir issue. From 31 July-2 August 1947, he made a two-day visit to Srinagar and a one-day visit to Jammu. In the course of these visits, he met, besides the Maharaja and Maharani, Prime Minister Ram Chandra Kak, Begum Abdullah, National Conference workers and members of the public. On 6 August, Gandhi briefly informed Nehru and Patel about what he said or noted during the meetings: “I told the Prime Minister about his unpopularity among the people... Both the Maharaja and Maharani admitted that with the lapse of British paramountcy, the true paramountcy of the people of Kashmir would commence. However much they might wish to join the Union, they would have to make the choice in accordance with the wishes of the people. How they could be determined was not discussed. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was most sanguine that the result of the free vote of the people, whether on the adult franchise or on the existing register, would be in favour of Kashmir joining the Union provided of course that Sheikh Abdullah and his co-prisoners were released, all bans were removed and the present Prime Minister was not in power. Probably he echoed the general sentiment.” Gandhi’s visit to Srinagar caused a decisive impact. Ram Chandra Kak was removed from the office of Prime Minister on 10 August and Sheikh Abdullah was released on 29 September. All this and strengthening of the road link between Pathankot and Jammu would seem to suggest that ground was being prepared for accession of the State to India. But there is no hard evidence to support the Pakistani charge that a “sinister design” had been worked out by India to secure the accession of the State. This charge, in fact, stands refuted not only by the assertion of Lord Mountbatten but also by the unambiguous statement of three services Chiefs of India who were all British, namely General RM Lockhart, Chief of the Indian Army; Air Marshal TW Elmhirst, Commander of the Royal Indian Air Force; and Rear Admiral JS Hall, Chief of the Royal Indian Navy. In a joint statement, they said: “On 24 October, the Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, received information that tribesmen had seized Muzaffarabad. This was the first indication of the raid. Prior to this date, no plans of any sort for sending Indian forces into Kashmir had been formulated or even considered.” On the other hand, Pakistan’s leaders, having attained their goal of a separate state by way of “direct action” and other questionable means, were in an aggressive frame of mind. They crafted an unusual plan to seize the state of Jammu and Kashmir by force. Under this plan, in order to cause dispersal of the State forces, skirmishes were manipulated all along the border, from Gilgit to Mirpur. Thereafter, on 22 October, a full scale tribal invasion, backed by Pakistan’s regulars, was launched. The tribesmen, comprising Afridis and Mahsuds and other “volunteers” and “freedom fighters”, were all operating under the overall command of Akbar Khan, a Major General in the Pakistani army who was given the code name of “General Tariq”. The state administration was so unprepared that it could not destroy the vital Krishan-Ganga bridge at Muzaffarbad for want of dynamite. Baramulla fell into the hands of the raiders on 24-26 October. Overtaken by their wild habits, they indulged in large-scale looting, burning, raping and killing. As noted by Father Shanks: “The tribesmen ~ great, wild, black beasts they were ~ came shooting their way down from the hills on both sides of the town. A 20-year old Indian nurse, Philomena, tried to protect a Muslim patient whose baby had just been born. She was shot dead first. The patient was next.” Even the St Joseph Convent was destroyed, and the Assistant Mother Superior and three nuns were brutally murdered. After visiting Baramulla, the correspondent of the New York Times wrote: “Surviving residents estimate that 3,000 of their fellow townsmen, including four Europeans and a retired British officer and his pregnant wife, were slain.” Though Gandhi criticised the raiders, his criticism of their beastly acts was rather mild and couched in general terms: “What they are doing will bring about the downfall of Islam and yet they say that they are doing all this for a free Kashmir.” However, he warmly approved of the dispatch of Indian armed forces for the defence of the state. He went to the extent of saying: “I would not shed a tear if the little Union force was wiped out bravely defending Kashmir like the Spartans at Thermopylae nor would I mind Sheikh Abdullah and his Muslim, Hindu and Sikh comrades dying at their post in defence of Kashmir.” Gandhi was criticised for his stand. His critics pointed out that during the Second World War Gandhi had advised Churchill, Hitler and Mussolini to follow his technique of non-violence. Why did he not give similar advice to his fellow-Indians, they asked. He countered: “I would be untrue to my faith if I refuse to assist in a just cause any person or measure that does not coincide with the principles of non-violence. The Indian armed force was sent in response to the appeals of Sheikh Abdullah, the Premier of Kashmir and the Maharaja. It is true that Kashmir should go to whom it belongs. In that case, all those who have gone from outside, be they Afridis and any other, should get out.” Gandhi preferred bilateral talks between India and Pakistan to a reference of the Kashmir issue being made to the United Nations. He thought that the reference would bring them only “monkey justice”. On two occasions at the end of December 1947, first on 25th and then on 29th, in the course of his post-prayers observations, he raised the question: “Could not the representatives of India and Pakistan sit down and thrash out the Kashmir affairs as they have already done in case of many other things? Could they not close their ranks and come to an amicable settlement with the assistance of impartial Indians? Or has impartiality fled from India?” Even after complaint had been made by India to the United Nations on 1 January 1948, Gandhi pleaded for its honourable withdrawal. At his prayer meeting on 4 January, he appealed to Pakistan to remain true to its name ~ clean ~ and wanted both the parties to have a change of heart. The understanding, he said, must be genuine; harbouring hatred would be worse than war. Gandhi’s aim was to ensure continuity of Hindu-Muslim unity, which he witnessed in Kashmir, and to extend it both to India and Pakistan. He wanted genuine understanding between the two countries. He was even thinking of going to Pakistan. He knew that the issue of Kashmir was like “a glowing match-stick in a rick of hay”, ever exposed to the risk of going up in flame. “At any rate, I won’t be there alive to witness it,” he remarked to Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, referring to the possibility of a war between India and Pakistan. “Is our independence going to end in such a fratricide?”

MARGINALIA : DIVIDE AND BE DAMNED!

Kashmir Times: Septermbet 21st, 2008

One of the greatest problems in the aftermath of the crisis over the Amarnath land transfer,besides the economic and political fallout throughout the state, is the Herculean task ofbridging the divide between the two regions of the state. The hardened posturing in Jammuevoked a similar reaction in the Valley. For the first time, the lines got blurred inKashmir between the anti-India sentiment and anti-Hindutava coupled with anti-Jammufeelings. The spark was provided by the anti-Kashmir discourse, that soon assumed communalovertones, when the agitation against revocation of the Amarnath Shrine Board land began inJammu. The call for economic blockade, which was publicly made by the Sangharsh Samitiseveral times, without any vehement opposition of the same by any quarters, was executedpartially or fully by the mobs on the highway at various places in Jammu region byruthlessly targeting Kashmir bound trucks and Kashmiri drivers. Such acts did not onlyseverely affect the supplies to the Valley but also to the other regions of the state likeRajouri, Poonch, Doda and Ladakh. Later, the Samiti chose to distance itself from the calland the government foolishly tried to cover up its own inefficiency in preventing ablockade, stating that technically it never occurred. But for the people of Kashmir, fearsparked by the highway attacks and shortage of supplies were enough reasons for panic and acounter agitation. For the first time in the history of the Kashmir conflict did Jammu become a word that could inspire not just anger but also hatred. This was a reaction to the 'anti-Kashmir' outburst in Jammu by the saffron brigade dominated by the Sangharsh Samiti, and unquestioned by even those who did not believe in this new wave of hatred invoked either out of fear, sheer complacency or the highly preposterous belief that all of Jammu's problems were created by the Kashmiri leaders. The net result was that Kashmir was as dreaded a word in Jammu, though not the in entire province as the diversity of cultures and demographic patterns in some areas yielded different affiliations, as much as Jammu became a disliked word in Kashmir. There are no dearth of incidents where the nomenclature became important for those who wanted to test the loyalties of the others. The threats to a newly opened Kashmir Square Mall, first of its kind in Jammu, to strike off the word 'Kashmir' from its nomenclature, forced the owners to change it to City Square. Hatred, and racist hatred at that, can be so shockingly amazing. How can cultures, identities and economies interlinked for years be intimidated intoshedding things that are so intrinsic to the lives of individuals and also collective cultures. Over the last more than one and a half century, both Kashmir and Jammu regionshave willingly borrowed from each other, assimilated and accommodated. How can everything be sifted and chaffed over night? How could names associated with business establishments,individuals be suddenly struck off? A number of men in Jammu may be named 'Kashmir Lal' or'Kashmir Singh'. Should they all look for a new identity? Transport companies, shops havenames inspired by Kashmir, a word that for years since the time of Maharajas, came to be anabbreviation for the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Should they all be rechristened? And whatabout Kashmiri Pandits, a major chunk of whom today live in Jammu? A vast majority of themwere vocally and physically active in Jammu's agitation, the migrant camps suddenly churningout Shiv Sainiks and Bajrangis by the dozens. Should they all be asked to assume a newidentity of 'Dogra pandits' or just 'migrant Pandits' with nothing to remind them or anybodyelse of the Kashmir link. And what about institutions like JK Bank, JK Police? Jammuites do not want the tag of Kashmir. Kashmiris do not want trade through Jammu. Sowhere really is the common ground? There may be nothing sacred about keeping J&K intact as aunit. But the interlinked economies of the two regions make building of bridges important.(Thankfully, majority of the business community in Jammu have belatedly understood thedivisive designs of the Hindutava groups that inspired Jammu's agitation and have refused toreact rashly to reservations raised by Kashmiri businessmen, though some have once againgullibly fallen into the trap.) And more than the economic question is the vitality of thecultural and religious overlappings. Jammu region has a good 30-35 percent Muslims, majorityof whom reside in Rajouri, Poonch and Doda. What is the fate of such regions in a dividedstate? And more importantly, what is the fate of Muslims in a communal divide? These areimportant questions that those talking about divisions need to grapple with. And solution,for building bridges, which is no ordinary task, lies mainly in these two complex dimensionsof economy as also cultural and religious overlappings. The SRTC employees agitation, withemployees from both Jammu and the Valley joining hands despite such a vitiated atmosphereshows the way. So does Jammu's past history of two decades when its people failed to succumbto any communal provocation and instead had begun to empathise with the increasing humanrights violations in Kashmir, which indicates the limited scope of the communal wave, thatis if it is treated in the right way. Those with a vested interest in unity and peace onlyneed to understand such signals, do a bit of re-introspection and then move ahead.